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THE RISE AND FALL AND RESURRECTION OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES 
Paul H. Robinson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of the states adopted 
comprehensive criminal codes based in large part upon the organization, if 
not the specific provisions, of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code.1  Kentucky did this in 1974.2  The hallmarks of these modern 
American codes—what made the Model Penal Code such an attractive 
model and so well known around the world—were three things.   
A.  Comprehensiveness 
First was the Code’s comprehensiveness.  The goal of the Model Penal 
Code drafters was to articulate all of the rules needed to adjudicate criminal 
liability and to set the level of seriousness (the grade) of each offense.  Such 
comprehensiveness is attractive for several reasons: It maximizes fair notice 
to citizens; it reduces discretion and disparity and increases uniformity in 
application; and it reserves criminalization decisions to the legislature, the 
most democratic branch, rather than delegating them de facto to the 
judiciary, who must fill in any holes left by the Code. 
The Model Penal Code has made the United States something of a 
global leader in comprehensive codification.  Around the world, one sees a 
variety of different codification situations.  The range of possibilities is 
illustrated in the appended graphic.3 
There remain few English-speaking countries that approximate pure 
common law without statutes, a “1” on the continuum.  Most British 
Commonwealth countries have had modern codification reforms.  At this 
point, perhaps only Ireland remains without something like a modern code.  
And Ireland was undertaking a criminal law codification project several 
years ago, although it looks now as though it has failed.  Ireland is probably 
a “2” on this codification continuum.   
                                                                                                                           
 
 * Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.  
 1 MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 2 Kentucky Penal Code Act, 1974 Ky. Acts 831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. L).  
 3 See infra Figure 1.  
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That quarter of American states that did not codify their criminal law 
during the 1960s and 1970s are typically a “3” on the continuum.  They 
have many criminal statutes covering most criminal conduct, but not 
integrated into an organized code.  And typically these states have no 
codified “general part,” setting out the general principles of liability and 
general defenses; no articulation of the general doctrines of imputation, 
such as complicity and voluntary intoxication; and no scheme for the 
consistent definition of culpability requirements and other terms used 
throughout the code.  Only states that modeled their codes after the Model 
Penal Code rated a “5” on the continuum. 
Many codes around the world are influenced by the German Penal 
Code,4 which is a “4” on the continuum.  That approach is comprehensive 
in its coverage but skeletal in its articulation.  That is, it has a full “special 
part” and “general part” and does not allow the judicial creation of offenses, 
but it does not purport to be a full statement of the liability and grading 
rules that a judge might need to adjudicate a case.  Instead, the German 
approach is one that leaves unarticulated a variety of concepts that the 
Germans think are better left to the sophistication and complexity 
developed over a century or more in German criminal law scholarship.  
Thus, for example, rather than attempting any articulation of what 
constitutes causation, as the Model Penal Code does,5 the German approach 
is to leave it to judges to consult the accumulated scholarship.6  This 
approach makes the German Penal Code and others like it more of a table of 
contents or an index, sending the reader to the relevant area of the scholarly 
literature. 
That approach may work well for the Germans, where many if not most 
judges are also scholars, or even professors, but works less well for those 
countries who have no such close relationship between the judiciary and 
academia and no easy access to the enormous body of German academic 
literature.  To these countries, the American approach, which aspires to true 
comprehensiveness in the articulation of all liability and grading rules, is 
more attractive simply because it is more practical. 
Interestingly, there do remain some criminal justice systems in the 
world that are a “1” on the codification continuum: Islamic law is 
                                                                                                                           
 
 4 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. 
I] 3322 (Ger.). 
 5 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03. 
 6 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Reforming American Penal Law, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 
98 (1999) (“For instance, the concept of causation, recognized by all modern penal codes as a 
constituent element of result offenses, goes undefined in . . . the German Penal Code, though not in the 
Model Penal Code.”).  
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traditionally uncodified.7  That may be changing, slowly,8 but it remains the 
state of affairs even in many modern Muslim societies. 
What is perhaps most striking about the state of codification around the 
world is that countries over time move from left to right on the codification 
continuum.  Sometimes that movement takes a long time, but once they 
move right, they essentially never move back to the left.  That is, once a 
society experiences the benefits of increased comprehensiveness in 
codification—fair notice, reduced discretion, increased uniformity, and 
legislative control—they have no interest in going back. 
There is one exception of sorts to this general principle, a phenomena 
that we see in almost all the modern American criminal codes enacted in the 
1960s or 1970s.  While the original codifications were a “5” on the 
continuum, the processes of crime politics of the past forty or fifty years 
have, as a practical matter, pushed these codes back from a “5” to provide 
considerably less of the advantages that their original codifications did.  
B.  Orderliness 
A second hallmark of modern criminal law codifications is the 
orderliness and uniformity of their drafting structure.  The offenses are 
segregated into different chapters according to the interest at stake and, 
within each chapter, are organized in order of seriousness.  Most 
importantly, there is a minimum of overlap between the offenses.  All 
conduct that deserves criminalization is included, ideally, under only one 
provision.  And the drafting style of provisions is clear and consistent 
throughout the document, with a large number of defined terms, and a 
single term having the same meaning throughout the code. 
C.  Principled 
A final hallmark of modern American codes based on the Model Penal 
Code is their principled nature.  The Model Penal Code drafters really did 
think through the principles that ought to underlie the criminal law rules.  
While they may have ended up some distance from principled perfection, 
they did at least try to reason out what the proper rule should be rather than 
                                                                                                                           
 
 7 See generally Paul H. Robinson, Adnan Zulfiqar, Margaret Kammerud, Michael Orchowski, 
Elizabeth A. Gerlach, Adam L. Pollock, Thomas M. O’Brien, John C. Lin, Tom Stenson, Negar Katirai, 
J. John Lee & Marc Aaron Melzer, Codifying Shari’a: International Norms, Legality and the Freedom to 
Invent New Forms, 2 J. COMP. L. 1 (2007). 
 8 See UNIV. OF PA. CRIMINAL LAW RESEARCH GRP., FINAL REPORT OF THE MALDIVIAN PENAL 
LAW AND SENTENCING CODIFICATION PROJECT (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522222.  
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simply codifying what had been done in the past or responding to the 
political pressures of the moment. 
II.  THE VIRTUES OF MODERN AMERICAN CODIFICATION 
Why should codes with these three characteristics—comprehensive, 
orderly, and principled—be so attractive?  Comprehensiveness, as noted 
previously,9 is important because it provides fair notice, reduces discretion 
and disparity, increases uniformity, and ensures that criminalization 
authority resides in the most democratic branch, the legislature.  To leave 
issues unresolved in the code is a de facto delegation of criminalization 
authority to the courts.  It is obviously important for courts to have some 
discretion in the adjudication of individual cases, but not regarding the rules 
that govern liability and punishment.  We must trust courts and juries to 
determine the facts in an individual case and to apply those facts to the 
governing law, but we must also insist that every defendant be judged by 
exactly the same law, without regard to their good or bad luck in the judge 
that they draw. 
Orderly structure, and in particular the avoidance of unnecessarily 
overlapping offenses, is important for a similar reason but involves different 
players.  The ideal code designates a specific offense and grade for any 
given occurrence of a criminal harm or evil.  When a criminal code has 
many overlapping offenses, it creates discretion and power in prosecutors to 
decide for themselves which of the different offenses will be charged and 
punished, or whether they should all be.  Again, this undermines the proper 
allocation of the criminalization authority of the legislature and invites 
unjustified disparity in similar cases depending upon a defendant’s good or 
bad luck in the prosecutor that they draw.  It also invites over-punishment 
where overlapping offenses punish the same harm or evil. 
Certainly an offender could engage in conduct that causes a variety of 
criminal harms and evils.  One criminal episode could include murder, 
arson, and rape, and each of these should be punished as a separate offense.  
But each of these three criminal harms ought to be punished as a single 
offense, not each as related, multiple offenses at the discretion of the 
prosecutor. 
Finally, the principled nature of a code is also important—and not just 
for philosophical reasons.  We value rationality and internal consistency for 
their own sake.  They are part of our notion of justice.  But there are also 
important practical reasons for having a criminal code that is principled, and 
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seen to be principled.   
Within the last several decades, social science has demonstrated the 
practical, crime-control value of building criminal law’s “moral credibility” 
with the community it governs.10  If criminal law is seen as just, it will gain 
deference and compliance rather than inspire resistance and subversion.  
Perhaps more importantly, criminal law that has earned a reputation with 
the community as a reliable moral authority gains the power to move people 
to internalize the law’s norms.  And that can be a more powerful—and a 
less expensive—mechanism of gaining compliance than any threat of 
criminal sanction.  But irrationalities and internal inconsistencies in a 
criminal code can quickly undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility, 
and thereby undermine its power to gain compliance and deference through 
social influence.  There is practical, crime-control value, then, in a criminal 
code that is internally consistent in its liability and grading rules and that is 
seen as reliably doing justice and avoiding injustice. 
III.  THE FALL OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES  
A.  Degradation of Existing Codes 
These important advantages of modern codification should be good 
news for all of those states that adopted modern codes, right?  It certainly 
was good news in the 1960s and 1970s when those new codes were 
enacted.  The problem is that since that time, there has been a continuing 
and accelerating flood of criminal law legislation that has tended to degrade 
those codes and to undermine the virtues of their original codification.11 
One might have thought that, after a new code was enacted, there might 
be a quick spurt of legislation to fix the gaps or ambiguities exposed by 
early practice, then a drop in legislation as all of the flaws were discovered 
and fixed.  In fact, just the reverse has occurred.  There was a mere trickle 
of criminal law legislation after enactment, but it typically has grown each 
year since.  And the new legislation is not tweaking one offense or another 
to make it clear or to keep it current with the advances of human activity.  
More often than not, existing statutes are ignored, and entirely new offenses 
are being created that overlap and often conflict with existing offenses.  In 
many states, forty years of accumulated criminal law legislation, 
                                                                                                                           
 
 10 See generally Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared 
Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 
(2012). 
 11 See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal 
Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635–44 (2005). 
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accelerating in rate each year, have left the original code unrecognizable—
lost under a mountain of often unnecessary, often contradictory, often 
overlapping, and often unprincipled additions to the original, 
comprehensive code.  Further, many of the new offenses are added to 
statutory titles outside of the criminal code. 
Perhaps these new overlapping offenses are a good idea—belt and 
suspenders, perhaps?  For a variety of reasons, I think not.  First, the 
growing mountain of offenses, inside and outside of the criminal code, 
make it increasingly unlikely that citizens really can sort out what the 
criminal law commands of them.  Second, as I noted previously, 
overlapping offenses create unhealthy discretion in prosecutors to decide 
what grade of an offense or how many offenses they will charge—
discretion that can produce seriously disparate results in similar cases 
simply because of the different views of different prosecutors, or because of 
the inconsistencies or prejudices of a single prosecutor.12  Perhaps even 
more problematic is the enormous potential for injustice that arises from 
such duplication.  Subjecting offenders to punishment for multiple, 
overlapping offenses can produce liability and punishment far beyond what 
the offender’s conduct justifies. 
Another problem comes from the conflicts between statutes and the 
resulting ambiguities.  What is a court to do when statutory terms are 
defined differently in different places?  Or if the same conduct is graded 
differently in different statutes?  And one may wonder: Why should we be 
empowering courts to get back into the criminalization business—to make 
legislative decisions forced upon them by such statutory conflicts and 
ambiguities?  How can a code be principled if different provisions provide 
different definitions of the same criminal harm, or provide different offense 
grades for the same conduct?  In other words, the proliferation problem 
undermines not only the criminal law’s orderliness, but also its principled 
nature and its reservation of the criminalization power to the legislature. 
These problems often occur because new legislation is not written to 
integrate into the code, but rather to layer on top of it without regard to 
what went before.  And, of course, layering produces a vicious cycle.  The 
messier that the code gets, the less able or inclined legislators are to 
integrate new legislation into the existing code.  The more new legislation 
that is layered on rather than integrated in, the more future legislation will 
layer rather than integrate until dozens, if not hundreds, of overlapping 
layers have been created.  If you imagine the original Kentucky Penal Code 
of 1974 as being the trim hull of a fast boat, the addition of hundreds of 
                                                                                                                           
 
 12 See supra Part II. 
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independent and overlapping patches can, over forty years, completely 
obscure the original design, turning it into an irregular blob. 
Another form of serious degradation has been the grading 
inconsistencies created in the flood of new offenses that are layered on, 
rather than integrated in, the codes.  It is not uncommon for legislators 
drafting a bill to do so in isolation, without consulting the existing grades of 
related offenses already contained in the criminal code.  The result is a 
collection of gross grading irrationalities that grow worse every year.  We 
have documented and illustrated this phenomena in several jurisdictions.13  
It is, unfortunately, simply the way of modern American criminal law 
legislation.  
A final form of degradation is found in statutes such as three-strikes 
legislation—or, in Kentucky, persistent felony offender legislation—that 
dramatically aggravate punishment for an offense based upon a defendant’s 
prior criminal record.14  We know from empirical studies that people do see 
some aggravation of blameworthiness and deserved punishment for repeat 
offenders.15  After being warned and punished for the first, the second 
offense is seen as a form of “nose thumbing,” as Andrew von Hirsch calls 
it, that adds to the offender’s blameworthiness.16   
But the studies also make clear that people see this repeat conduct as a 
form of offense aggravation like other aggravations, perhaps increasing the 
offense punishment by 10%, 20%, or even 30%.  But many repeat offender 
statutes make the offender’s prior criminal history more important than the 
offense itself, often doubling or more the punishment imposed.17  These 
dramatic increases seriously conflict with ordinary people’s intuitions of 
justice and can only serve to bring the system into disrepute—to undermine 
the system’s “moral credibility” with the community it governs.  
In a similar vein is the enormous growth of mandatory minimum 
sentences.  I understand the initial, understandable motivation for 
mandatory minimums.  There was a period in our history in which judges 
were given vast discretion in sentencing, and many judges took that 
opportunity to regularly produce gross failures of justice.  But there is now 
a well-developed solution to that problem—sentencing guidelines, in which 
judges continue to have the flexibility to take into account the unique 
circumstances of each individual case, but also have the guidance and 
                                                                                                                           
 
 13 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 11, at 641–44.  
 14 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).  
 15 See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME (1996).  
 16 See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as Criminal 
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1437 (2001).   
 17 See id. at 1435 & n.25.  
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incentive to try to match their judgments with those of other sentencing 
judges.18  
With the development of sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum 
sentences are now archaic and destructive.  They essentially guarantee a 
stream of injustices, as some offenders in some cases really will have the 
kind of important mitigations that demand a sentence in the lower end of 
the range forbidden by the mandatory minimum.  This guarantee of a string 
of mandatory minimum injustices can only serve in the long run to 
undermine the criminal justice system’s reputation for being just, for being 
a reliable assessment of the punishment that each offender genuinely 
deserves.  And, as noted previously, that loss of moral credibility can have 
serious consequences in the system’s loss of crime control effectiveness.19 
B.  Causes of Degradation 
What drives this degradation of existing criminal law?  The underlying 
causes of degradation are found primarily in the inherent nature of the 
legislative process.20  Many amendments and new offenses are enacted for 
purely political purposes: Politicians propose a bill to show concern 
regarding an issue about which their constituents are concerned.  We cannot 
be too critical here.  They are simply trying to be responsive to their 
community—normally something we see as a good thing, a basic feature of 
democracy in action.  They may be responding to an especially grim case in 
the headlines or a case where an offender seemed to have received too little 
punishment.  
But in many of these cases, the problem has little to do with a flaw in 
an existing criminal law rule.  Not every problem can be fixed with a 
criminal code amendment.  People will continue to commit outrageous 
crimes, judges will continue to make what are seen as sentencing errors, and 
so on.  Yet, legislators often feel a need to do something to show that they 
are sensitive to their constituents’ concerns.  And there are a few 
“somethings” that they can do.  Changing or adding to the criminal law is 
one of those few things.  But when crime legislation is simply a vehicle for 
expressing concern, drafters have little reason to take account of existing 
law.  They aren’t really fixing a code problem, but rather are using their bill 
as a vehicle to send an empathetic message of concern to their constituents.  
We should not be surprised by overlaps and inconsistencies because there is 
                                                                                                                           
 
 18 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2014); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 264–65 (2005). 
 19 See supra Part II. 
 20 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 11, at 644–45.  
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little motivation to integrate: Overlayering is always easier and faster and 
often sends a clearer and more dramatic message.   
Unfortunately, criminal law bills, even if useless and unnecessary, 
commonly pass because legislators share a common reluctance to appear 
“soft on crime.”  When a new and unnecessary offense, say “library theft,” 
is proposed, the issue becomes a referendum on whether legislators care 
about public libraries, not on whether the proposed legislation will actually 
do anything new to combat the problem of such theft, or on whether it will 
instead have pernicious ramifications for the application of the criminal 
code’s general theft provision.  A legislator is likely to vote in favor of the 
library-theft bill because there is a clear constituency—library users and 
taxpayers—who would seem to share a concern about library theft, and no 
constituency to complain about the new provision’s less obvious and more 
diffuse drawbacks in creating inconsistencies, ambiguities, and overlaps.21 
The larger point is that criminal law legislation provides an important 
vehicle by which legislators can signal to their constituents that they are 
concerned, and are doing something, about the crime concerns that their 
constituents may have at that moment.  With that, it matters little whether 
the criminal law legislation simply duplicates, perhaps in inconsistent 
terms, offenses already on the books. 
Another sort of systemic problem might be called punishment inflation.  
In order to emphasize how seriously the legislators take the new offense 
created, the heat of the moment naturally pushes the grade of the offense 
higher than it might otherwise be.  A year or two later, when that heat has 
died down, the grade may seem “out of whack” with other offenses.  But 
the exaggerated grade lives on. 
Worse, the dynamic creates a vicious cycle.  Having exaggerated the 
grade of yesterday’s “crime du jour,” the legislator, in order to adequately 
express outrage over today’s crime du jour, must exceed the new, 
exaggerated baseline established by yesterday’s offense.  The ultimate 
effect is to create an upward spiral of grading and a hodgepodge of 
inconsistent offense grades.  There is no fixing this problem ad hoc.  
Internal grading consistency throughout a code requires examining all of its 
offense and sub-offense grades at one time, comparing each against the 
grade of every other offense. 
In talking about the problem of degradation of existing criminal codes, I 
do not mean to single out Kentucky.  We see this unhealthy dynamic in 
every state that we have investigated.22  I do not know the details of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
 21 See id.  
 22 See Paul H. Robinson, Thomas Gaeta, Matthew Majarian, Megan Schultz & Douglas M. Weck, 
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criminal law legislation dynamics in Kentucky, but there seems little reason 
to think that it is uniquely saved from the normal destructiveness of the 
process.  It may be better off than many other states,23 but there nonetheless 
are reasons to be concerned.  A Kentucky law professor recently estimated 
that there are now 440 provisions in the criminal code and 1800 criminal 
offenses outside of the code.24  These are dramatic increases over what 
existed when the Kentucky Penal Code was enacted in 1974.  In 
comparison to Kentucky, however, many other states are much worse.25 
What is to be done about the current mess in which we find ourselves?  
Let me suggest some short-term solutions, but also some long-term 
strategies. 
IV.  THE RESURRECTION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES 
A.  Short-Term Solutions 
The short-term goal must be to reduce the mountain of overlapping 
provisions to a single, integrated code, as existed with the original 1974 
codification.  This can only be done through a major overhaul, which will 
take into account all of the existing accumulated statutes.  It cannot be done 
piecemeal or ad hoc.  Let me suggest some basic principles in doing this 
work.   
First, there ought to be a strong preference for including all nontrivial 
offenses in the criminal code itself, not scattered in titles outside of the 
code.   
Second, offenses ought to be defined as much as possible to identify 
distinct, non-overlapping harms.  Identify the basic harm or evil, and 
capture it in one offense.  If a criminal episode embodies several distinct 
harms or evils, they can all be accounted for by convicting the offender for 
a series of non-overlapping offenses.   
Third, the legislature ought to provide as much grading distinction 
within an offense as possible.  It ought to identify those forms of the offense 
                                                                                                                           
The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709, 718–28 (2010).  
 23 See Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best) 
American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 60–61 (2000) (ranking criminal codes using a 
qualitative scoring system and finding Kentucky’s Penal Code ranks eleventh). 
 24 E-mail from William A. Hilyerd, Assoc. Professor of Legal Bibliography, Louis D. Brandeis Sch. 
of Law, to Paul H. Robinson, Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., & Luke M. 
Milligan, Assoc. Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis Sch. of Law (Aug. 28, 2014) (on file with author).  
Forms of criminal activity that did not exist in 1974 require a trivial number of new offenses.  
Traditional theft, for example, punishes taking “a thing of value,” even if that thing now includes 
intangible computer data. 
 25 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 11, at 635–37. 
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that merit more punishment and those that merit less.  This is a value 
judgment that ought to be made by the legislature, not left to the judiciary 
or prosecutors to decide ad hoc, which is what happens when the legislature 
enacts statutes containing a wide range of offenses without identifying the 
factors that distinguish more serious violations from less serious violations.  
In other words, including sufficient offense grades is important both to 
preserve the criminalization authority to the legislature and to ensure 
uniformity in application of these grading judgments to different 
defendants. 
Fourth, the drafters ought to avoid “combination offenses” as much as 
possible.  Such offenses are particularly common in new legislation: taking 
two individual offenses and combining them to create a brand-new third 
offense, such as “carjacking.”26  Is anyone really worried that carjacking 
was not a serious offense before the new carjacking statutes were enacted?  
Theft, assault, and kidnapping statutes all exist in every jurisdiction in the 
country.  If the legislature wants to provide that some forms of these 
offenses are more serious, it need only add a grade aggravator to that effect 
in the existing offense; there is no need to create a special, new combination 
offense. 
One of the problems with combination offenses is that they reduce 
grading nuance.  Let me use robbery, a long-existing combination offense, 
to illustrate the problem.  Robbery is the combination of theft and assault or 
threat.27  As the graphic illustrates,28 a jurisdiction might have four grades 
of each of these two offenses.  (In fact, a jurisdiction is likely to have many 
more grades than this.)  When the two offenses are combined into robbery, 
however, a similar four-category grading scheme for robbery reduces the 
grading nuance by three-quarters.  Of the sixteen possible combinations of 
grades provided by the four grades of theft and the four grades of assault, 
the four robbery grades must ignore twelve of the sixteen combinations.  (In 
fact, many if not most jurisdictions have fewer grades of robbery than 
four.29)  When grading robbery, which grading distinctions for theft and for 
assault are to be ignored?  And what justification can be used for ignoring 
them?  If the drafters have already determined that they are important 
enough to alter the grade of the theft offense or the assault offense, why not 
also the robbery offense? 
                                                                                                                           
 
 26 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012) (federal anti-carjacking statute); CAL. PENAL CODE § 215 
(West 2014) (state anti-carjacking statute).  
 27 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 28 See infra Figure 2.   
 29 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 515.020–.030 (West 2006) (defining robbery in the first- and 
second-degrees).  
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For these reasons and others, the Model Penal Code drafters thought 
seriously about dropping such combination offenses as robbery and 
burglary, but finally decided to keep them simply because they had such a 
long history, and states would expect to see them in the Code.30  That may 
be an adequate justification for keeping these two combination offenses, but 
the damage to grading nuance strongly suggests that the modern popularity 
of inventing new combination offenses ought to be abandoned. 
Fifth, there ought to be a strong preference for updating an existing 
offense rather than creating a new offense.  Thus, the general theft offense 
ought to be relied upon to punish all forms of unlawful taking of the 
property of another, be it library thefts or the theft of intangible data.  To 
the extent that some special definitions are required to ensure the adequate 
coverage of the offense, then they can and should be added.  But there is 
little to be gained, and much to be lost, by creating new offenses of library 
theft or data theft.  We ought to avoid creating a host of special theft 
offenses scattered throughout the criminal code, or even outside the code, 
and ought to aim instead for consolidating offenses of a similar or related 
nature. 
Sixth, as noted previously, the code ought to provide definitions of 
terms whenever it would be useful.31  Most importantly, the same term 
ought to have the same definition throughout the code.  If some different 
meaning is needed in a special context, then a different term ought to be 
used to carry that different meaning. 
Finally, after defining offenses and determining the grades for each 
offense and sub-offense, the drafters ought to undertake a general study of 
the internal coherence of the grades that they have assigned.32  Here is the 
procedure I recommend.  After deciding how many offense-grading 
categories to recognize, identify for each category at least two specific 
offense examples to serve as “milestones”—a set of markers against which 
every other offense or sub-offense in the code can be compared and tested.  
For each offense with a separate grade, the drafters should ask whether the 
conduct described in that offense matches the seriousness of the milestone 
                                                                                                                           
 
 30 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1 cmt. 2, 222.1 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980) (discussing rationale for retaining burglary and robbery, respectively, as combination offenses). 
 31 See supra Part I.B. 
 32 For examples of how these studies could be conducted, see generally Robinson, Gaeta, Majarian, 
Schultz & Weck, supra note 22; Paul H. Robinson, Rebecca Levenson, Nicholas Feltham, Andrew 
Sperl, Kristen-Elise Brooks, Agatha Koprowski, Jessica Peake, Benjamin Probber & Brian Trainor, 
Report on Offense Grading in New Jersey (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 11-
03, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737825; Paul H. Robinson, Report on Offense Grading 
in Pennsylvania (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 10-01, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527149.   
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offense, or whether perhaps it better matches the seriousness of the next-
higher milestone offense or the next-lower milestone offense.  At the end of 
the process, the drafters can produce a list of all offenses and sub-offenses 
in each grading category, and they can then perform a quality control check 
by working through all of the offenses in that category to confirm that they 
all do indeed reflect a comparable level of seriousness.  
This grading exercise was performed in relation to the Kentucky Penal 
Code Revision Project in 2003.  The Final Report of the Kentucky Penal 
Code Revision Project contains a table for each offense grade, including a 
list of all of the sub-offenses from the draft code with that grading 
classification.33  The process of producing these summary grading tables 
was one that revealed many grading inconsistencies that had previously 
gone unnoticed during the drafting process. 
B.  The Political Feasibility of Recodification 
I have made the case here for a general recodification of existing 
criminal statutes.  Such a project is clearly feasible from a drafting point of 
view.  It is essentially what was done by the Kentucky Penal Code Revision 
Project in 2003, although the work now will require incorporating the many 
new and overlapping provisions that have accumulated in the decade since. 
One may wonder, however, whether such a project is politically 
feasible.  The Kentucky Attorney General’s Office opposed the Revision 
Project.34  And that is not an irrational position for prosecutors, at least 
those with a short-term perspective.  They benefit from the current disorder 
of the Kentucky Penal Code, especially the variety of overlapping offenses 
that have arisen from the hundreds of criminal law amendments layered 
over the original.  So perhaps I should speak most directly to prosecutors’ 
needs and concerns, and explain why these kinds of reforms ought to be 
attractive to them.  Yes, the current mess does give them many overlapping 
offenses and, consequently, much flexibility and discretion in how and what 
to charge in any given situation.  They have the ability to take an offense 
and treat it as something relatively minor or to transform it into a whole 
string of serious offenses.  The appeal to prosecutors is understandable.   
But prosecutors should be aware that there is also a cost to it, albeit a 
hidden cost.  Not only does it create a messy system aesthetically, but it 
also has several unattractive practical consequences.  It gives the system a 
                                                                                                                           
 
 33 KY. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY PENAL CODE REVISION 
PROJECT 135–52 (2003).  
 34 See 2 id. at 333.  
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reputation as being more unpredictable, more discretionary, and therefore 
less uniform and more disparate in its treatment of defendants.  But why 
should prosecutors care about the system’s reputation for reliability and 
consistency in doing justice and avoiding injustice?  Let me suggest why 
they should care.   
As I hinted at earlier, social scientists have shown us—with studies that 
have arisen only since the original Kentucky Penal Code—that the greatest 
power of the criminal justice system may lie not in its threat of official 
sanction, but rather in the social influence of its moral authority.35  A 
criminal justice system that has more credibility with the community it 
governs is more likely to prompt acquiescence in support rather than 
resistance and subversion.  This reputational effect can influence players 
throughout the system.  Do witnesses report crimes?  Do they cooperate 
with investigators?  Do jurors follow their instructions?  The system’s 
reputation even influences the professional players within it.  Do police, 
prosecutors, and judges follow the spirit and text of legislative rules, or do 
they feel free to make up their own rules?  A system that has earned a 
reputation for great moral credibility will gain deference.  A system that has 
not will inspire resistance and subversion. 
Perhaps even more important than this is the influence that the system’s 
reputation has in gaining compliance from citizens.  A system that has 
earned a reputation as a reliable moral authority is more likely to gain 
deference from people in those important cases in which the moral status of 
the law’s prohibition is ambiguous.  Is downloading music without a license 
really condemnable?  Is insider trading?  Is coercing consent to intercourse 
on a date really condemnable?  Criminal law that has earned a reputation as 
a moral authority will not only gain compliance in these gray area cases, 
but, most importantly, is more likely to induce all citizens to internalize the 
norms that the criminal law announces.  In contrast, a criminal law seen as 
regularly doing injustice loses its moral credibility with the community and 
loses its power to gain deference and compliance, as well as the power to 
induce the internalization of its norms. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that prosecutors are not 
persuaded by this research and these arguments.  Let me suggest to 
legislators that they ought to press ahead nonetheless, even in the face of 
prosecutorial opposition.  Not only would they have on their side all of the 
arguments described above about the practical, crime-control value of a 
                                                                                                                           
 
 35 See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT (2013); 
Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1940 (2010); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 
(1997). 
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system with a reputation for consistency and uniformity in doing justice and 
avoiding injustice, but they also would have a good political reason to press 
for these reforms. 
Just as the enactment of a comprehensive criminal code shifted 
criminalization authority away from the judiciary and vested it in the more 
democratic legislative branch, so too does the process of systematic 
degradation of a comprehensive criminal code shift criminalization 
power—shifting it away from the legislature and to the prosecutor.  That is 
not only bad because of its long-term effect of undermining the moral 
authority of the criminal justice system by producing inconsistent and 
unpredictable results, but also is bad because it takes those criminalization 
decisions away from where they belong—from the people of Kentucky 
through their elected representatives in the legislature.  A criminal code that 
gives prosecutors so many different options on how to treat any given 
criminal offense is a criminal code by which the legislature forsakes its 
important role in reflecting the community’s shared views about justice. 
The only way that a criminal justice system can be predictable and 
consistent in its criminal liability and punishment is to have a criminal code 
that on its face controls basic liability and punishment decisions.  Every 
defendant ought to be treated the same, no matter who they have as a 
prosecutor.  Every victim’s chance at true justice ought to be the same, no 
matter who prosecutes their case.  That requires a comprehensive and 
tightly-defined system of offenses, based upon a coherent grading structure, 
applicable the same in all cases, and only the General Assembly can 
provide that. 
Even if all of this is true, is it realistic to think that legislators—even 
knowing that it is the right thing to do—can rise above their political fears 
to oppose what prosecutors want?  Even if the alternative is to essentially 
give up their legislative power to the prosecutors, is it realistic that 
legislators would oppose prosecutors on criminal law matters?  After all, 
the reality is that every legislator’s primary concern, if they are to continue 
to do their good works, must be to get reelected.  They can do no good 
works if they lose the next election.  Is not the political risk that comes from 
opposing prosecutors just too high to expect them to take it?  Being accused 
of being “soft on crime” can be a powerful election cudgel for their 
opponent. 
But here is where structural changes to the system can make a 
difference.  Let me then talk about long-term strategies to effective criminal 
law reform. 
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C.  Long-Term Strategies 
Stepping back for a moment from the political feasibility question, let 
us assume for the sake of argument that a new criminal code was, in fact, 
enacted following the drafting principles I have previously detailed.36  This 
would be a good thing.  But for how long would it last?  Why would the 
same processes and influences that caused the degradation of the 1974 
Kentucky Penal Code over the past four decades not still be at work, ready 
to begin degrading the new code as soon as it was enacted?  If the 
degradation problem is to be solved long-term, it requires some strategies 
that will undermine the degradation process.  Is that possible? 
I believe that it is possible, but let me be frank in conceding that it has 
not yet been done.  We are at a point where most states are very much in 
need of recodification and of a long-term strategy for avoiding future 
degradation, but no state has yet done it.  Perhaps Kentucky can provide the 
model. 
Let me suggest a variety of mechanisms that might help.  All of them 
are designed toward the same goal: to provide what might be called 
“amendment discipline” in future criminal law legislation. 
First, future amendments should revise the existing criminal code 
provisions; they should integrate into them rather than overlaying them.  Of 
course, this requires some continuing body with influence over legislative 
proposals that can build and retain expertise on the structure and drafting 
style of the criminal code.  This could be a body outside of the legislature, 
such as the Criminal Justice Council, or some other, newly-created body.  
But it would have to be given somehow (or perhaps just take) the role of 
critiquing criminal law reform proposals in light of the existing code 
provisions.  This critique could be very much helped by requiring all 
proposed legislation concerning criminal law to be accompanied by an 
“impact statement” (or something of that nature) that would describe all of 
the existing law on the subject and explain why that existing law is 
inadequate or flawed and why the proposed legislation would fix the 
problem.   
Another aspect of “amendment discipline” is to ensure that only 
essential changes are made to existing law—that the proposed revision is 
truly necessary to solve a real problem and can do so.  Of course, when 
criminal law legislation is used simply as a vehicle to send a message of 
concern to constituents, it will be difficult (if not impossible) for proponents 
of legislation to make the case that the legislation is essential.  The point is 
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that amending the criminal code ought to be the last resort—not the first.  If 
the problem can be solved with a memorandum to judges or prosecutors 
urging them to interpret or apply existing law differently, then that ought to 
be preferred. 
This suggests another structural change in the process that might be 
useful.  As mentioned before, we need to be sympathetic to the situation in 
which legislators find themselves.37  They will always want to find some 
way to communicate their empathetic concern to their constituents.  To 
avoid having that message vehicle be unnecessary criminal code 
amendments, perhaps the process should create an alternative vehicle.  A 
good candidate could be to provide an official commentary to the new penal 
code, which would have a standing similar to legislative history in the 
interpretation of the code’s provisions.38  Thus, an official commentary 
would be promulgated to accompany the recodification and, most 
importantly, would be a living document to be kept up-to-date by legislative 
revision as needed.  Thus, when a case in the news has constituents worked 
up, it may be enough of a signal of concern from legislators to pass 
legislation to modify the official commentary.   
If librarians are anxious to have some special public confirmation that 
taking library books is theft, a line could be added to the official 
commentary to the theft offense confirming that taking public library books 
is theft.  That legislative action may be all that is needed to keep the 
librarians happy.  It may well be that the added sentence is, as a practical 
matter, unnecessary, but its real value is in providing an outlet for the 
expression of legislative concern without creating a troublesome new, 
overlapping theft offense. 
Another aspect of structural reform addresses the problem of irrational 
grading.  I suggested previously that the recodification project include a 
process of comparing all offenses and sub-offenses to “milestone” examples 
of each grading category.39  I would recommend that proponents of new 
offenses or new grades be obliged to undertake that same task.  Perhaps as 
part of the required “impact statement,” a bill’s sponsors would be required 
to compare their new offense or new offense grading provision to the 
milestone examples for the offense grade that they are proposing, and to 
                                                                                                                           
 
 37 See supra Part III.B.  
 38 Cf. Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. Capital Cmty. Econ./Indus. Dev. Corp., 434 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Ky. 
2014) (“Where a statute is ambiguous, we resort to legislative history, canons of statutory construction 
and, in the case of uniform statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code, interpretations by other 
courts.  In this case, we also have the benefit of Official Comments to the UCC provisions, Comments 
which the legislature has indicated ‘represent the express legislative intent of the General Assembly and 
shall be used as a guide for interpretation.’” (citations omitted)). 
 39 See supra Part IV.A.  
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compare it to the other sub-offenses with that same grade in the current 
code.  
Such “impact reports” could spark a healthy debate about whether the 
proposed criminal law revision is, in fact, appropriate and necessary.  And 
where some body with criminal law expertise exists outside of the 
legislature—be it the Criminal Justice Council, or some other official or 
unofficial body—the resulting public debate could provide just the political 
cover that legislators need to vote against an unnecessary new offense or an 
inappropriate grading increase.  Of course, this can only work if the 
independent body has earned credibility with the public—has shown itself 
to be as opposed to inappropriate failures of justice as it is opposed to 
injustice.  But once it has earned that credibility, the thoughtful legislator 
can do the right thing and vote against the unnecessary or inappropriate 
criminal law legislation without fear of being labeled “soft on crime” at the 
next election. 
There are many crime problems that will create concern among voters, 
but the truth is that many if not most of them cannot be solved with 
amendments to the criminal code.  Changing police procedures, increasing 
police funding, promoting job training and education, developing better 
drug and alcohol programs, and a host of other reforms may be the real 
solution to the problem.  But these are often outside of the reach of 
legislators.  Amending the criminal code is a lever of power within easy 
reach, and if we are to avoid degradation of the criminal code in the future, 
we must develop a system in which legislators can realistically be expected 
to resist the easy response of pulling that particular lever of power. 
I have suggested several structural changes here.  Frankly, however, it 
is only the legislators themselves who are in a position to know what kind 
of changes are feasible, and who can actually succeed in bringing about 
“amendment discipline” in the future. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Just as most states codified their criminal laws in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the next several decades will see those same states struggling with what to 
do with their increasingly dysfunctional and chaotic criminal codes.  Some 
of those codes have grown to six, seven, or eight times the size of their 
original codification, yet with very little actual additional criminalization.  
That mountain of overlapping legal provisions does little but produce 
inconsistency and uncertainty, and the problem grows worse every year as 
the avalanche of criminal law legislation not only continues in most states, 
but accelerates. 
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FIGURE 2. THE PROBLEM OF COMBINATION OFFENSES 
 
                Offense of Theft    Offense of Threat or Assault 
Sample Element 1 Amount is greater than or equal to 
$5,000 
Act causes serious bodily injury 
Sample Element 2 Amount is greater than or equal to 
$500, but less than $5,000 
Act causes bodily injury 
Sample Element 3 Amount is greater than or equal to 
$50, but less than $500 
Act of physical menacing causes 
fear of serious bodily injury 
Sample Element 4 Amount is less than $50 Threat of act causes fear of 
serious bodily injury 
 
Combination Offense of Robbery  
Usually, robbery has three or four grades.  
The drafters select certain combinations of 
the theft and threat or assault factors to 
create the robbery grades. 
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Using the distinctions identified as significant, the code would recognize sixteen varieties of 
“robbery” (i.e., four theft categories x four threat or assault categories), depending on the 
combination of theft and threat or assault factors.  The combination offense must ignore 
twelve of the sixteen combinations. 
 
  

